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The attorney-client privilege, "a hallmark of Anglo-American jurisprudence for almost 400 years,"' is one of the oldest and most revered
privileges in American law, but it is not without its exceptions. One such
exception is "at issue" waiver of the privilege.2
In Illinois the attorney-client privilege is codified by Supreme Court
Rule 201(b)(2): "All matters that are privileged against disclosure on the
trial, including privileged communications between a party or his agent and
the attorney for the party, are privileged against disclosure through any discovery procedure." 3 The purpose of the privilege is "to encourage and promote full and frank consultation between a client and legal advisor by removing the fear of compelled disclosure of information. ' A It is the attorneyclient privilege, not the duty to disclose, that is the exception, and therefore
the privilege is to be strictly confined to its narrowest possible limits. 5 As
*
Court counsel to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Palau; J.D., 2007, The
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
1. See Mitchell v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 691 P.2d 642, 645 (Cal.
1984).
2.
At issue waiver is often referred to in other jurisdictions as "implied waiver" or
even occasionally as "in issue waiver," see Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 153, 161 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), but Illinois courts generally refer to the doctrine
as "at issue waiver," see, e.g., Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d
322, 331 (Il1. 1991).
3. ILL. SUP. CT.R. 201(b)(2).
4.
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 256 (I11.
1982).
5. See id. at 257.
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with any privilege, the attorney-client privilege hampers the truth-seeking
function of law and therefore is not to be applied nonchalantly.
I.
A.

APPLICATION OF AT ISSUE WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
A SHORT HISTORY

Although it can trace its origins in American law to the Gilded Age,6
at issue waiver of the attorney-client privilege is a still-developing facet of
evidentiary law to which courts around the country have taken differing
approaches. Generally, at issue waiver of the attorney client privilege occurs when a party pleads a claim or defense that places at issue the subject
matter of privileged material over which she has control.
The split in authority occurs over the meaning of placing a communication at issue. Four lines of decisions have formed: (1) the automatic
waiver rule, (2) the balancing test, (3) the Hearn test, and (4) the anticipato7
ry waiver test.
Neither of the first two tests is presently regarded as viable. 8 Under the
automatic waiver approach, a litigant who asserts a claim, counterclaim, or
affirmative defense injecting an issue into the forefront of the litigation,
automatically waives all corresponding privileges. 9 Although consistent,
automatic waiver results in unwarranted waivers. The second approach, the
balancing test, weighs the need for the discovery against the need to protect
the secrecy of the information.' 0 While sensitive to subtleties in particular
cases, application of the balancing test leads to inconsistent results. Because
of their respective shortcomings, neither of these two approaches is favored."'
6.
See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1888).
7.
See T. Maxfield Bahner & Michael L. Gallion, Waiver of Attorney-client Privilege via Issue Injection: A Callfor Uniformity, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 199, 201-05 (1998) (advocating for the adoption of the Hearn test).
8. See id. at 201-02; see also FDIC v. Wise, 139 F.R.D. 168, 171 (D. Colo. 1991)
(stating that the automatic waiver approach is "too rigid" while the balancing test suffers
from "lack of concreteness").
9.
See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 201; see also Indep. Prods. Corp. v.
Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ("Plaintiffs in this civil action have initiated the action and forced defendants into court. If plaintiffs had not brought the action,
they would not have been called on to testify. Even now, plaintiffs need not testify if they
discontinue the action. They have freedom and reasonable choice of action.").
10.
See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 202; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1579-81 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing and applying-without
adopting-the balancing test).
11.
See Bahner & Gallion, supra note 7, at 201-02.
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B.

A TISSUE WAIVER OF THE A TTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN ILLINOIS

THE HEARN TEST

The test for at issue waiver that took hold in the mid-1970s is the
Hearn test, which takes it name from the decision in which its genesis may
be found, Hearn v. Rhay.12 The Hearn test has been distilled into a threeprong inquiry:
If (i) assertion of the privilege is the result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party, (ii)
through the affirmative action, the asserting party has
placed the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case, and (iii) application of the privilege would
deny the opposing party access to information vital to its
defense, the court should find that the asserting party has
impliedly waived the privilege through its own affirmative
conduct. 13
Under the third prong, courts deem
information to be "vital" only if it is not
14
available from any other source.
Although widely adopted and followed because it retains most of the
flexibility of the balancing test while (at least superficially) injecting predictability into the process with its three-pronged approach, uneven application of the Hearn test over the past thirty years has given rise to increasing
criticism of the test from the bench and academics alike. Because every
affirmative pleading will make new material relevant to the action, the first
two factors of the Hearn test have been derided as mere window dressingfactors that do not actually limit the finding of waiver. 15 And the third factor of the Hearn test has been criticized because it balances the attorneyclient privilege-an absolute privilege that has been recognized after
weighing the system-wide costs and benefits of the privilege16against the
opposing party's need for the information in an individual case.
C.

THE ANTICIPATORY WAIVER TEST

Under the fourth approach, the anticipatory waiver test, a party waives
the attorney-client privilege when she places the advice of counsel at issue
by (i) asserting a claim or defense and (ii) then seeking to prove that claim
12.
13.
14.
1998).
15.
1629, 1640
16.

68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
FDIC v. Wise, 139 F.R.D. 168, 171 (D. Colo. 1991).
See, e.g., Frontier Ref. Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 701 (10th Cir.
See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
(1985).
See id.
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17
or defense by disclosing or describing an attorney-client communication.
This test abides by
the maxim that a privilege is to be used as a "shield,"
18
"sword."
a
as
not

1I.
A.

AT ISSUE WAIVER IN ILLINOIS

CASE LAW IN SEARCH OF A RUDDER

Illinois cases dealing with at issue waiver fail to address which approach is to be used to determine when a communication is sufficiently
placed at issue so as to waive the attorney-client privilege. As illustrated
below, Illinois case law on at issue waiver lacks defmitive guidance.
The Illinois Supreme Court wrote on at issue waiver in Waste Management, Inc. v. InternationalSurplus Lines Insurance Co. 19 The supreme
court stated that it "agree[d] that defense counsel's litigation files in the
underlying cases are relevant and at issue in the present declaratory judgment action., 20 However, because the court found that the attorney-client
privilege did not apply in that case for other reasons, its comments on at
issue waiver are dicta. Although the supreme court did not discuss the tests,
its reference to relevance suggests a Hearn-like approach to at issue waiver;
however, as a statement of dicta that fails to reference Hearn or any of the
tests, the comment does not provide sturdy footing for further analysis. 1
The Illinois Supreme Court fielded the issue again in Fischel & Kahn,
Ltd. v. Van Straaten Gallery, Inc.22 The defendant had counterclaimed
against Fischel & Kahn for legal malpractice surrounding the defense and
settlement of a prior litigation. Fischel & Kahn claimed that the malpractice
counterclaim waived the defendant's attorney-client privilege with respect
17.

See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir.

1994).
18.
See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983) (privilege against selfincrimination); MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688, 701 (1897) (privilege of infancy).
19.
579 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1991).
20.
Id. at 327.
21.
Illinois federal courts have not come to a consensus regarding at issue waiver of
the attorney client privilege. Compare, e.g., Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Auto-

mations, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 269, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (referring to Hearn as "the seminal case"
on at issue waiver), with Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 268, 275-76 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (discrediting PyramidControls and applying the Rhone-Poulenc anticipatory waiver
test in an Illinois diversity case), and Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP, 251
F.R.D. 316, 324 (N.D. 111.2008) (following Dexia in an Illinois diversity case: "[I]t is not
sufficient that a party merely deny an allegation, or that the documents are relevant to the
claim."). See also Kordek v. United Agri Prod., Inc., 2007 WL 1118435, *4-5 (N.D. 11. Apr.
16, 2007) (applying the reasoning of PyramidControls in an Illinois diversity case and finding Dexia and similarly-decided cases to be unfaithful to Lama, discussed infra).
22.
727 N.E.2d 240 (Il. 2000).
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to the previous litigation, including the defendant's subsequent representation by another law firm, Pope & John.23 The court distinguished the case
before it from another case-a case which relied on Hearn-by saying that
the material sought by Fischel & Kahn was not vital to its defense of the
malpractice action.24 Because the privileged material represented only the
most convenient means-not the only means-to determine whether and to
what extent the defendant's loss resulted from malpractice, the court held
that the attorney-client
privilege was not waived by the initiation of the
25
malpractice suit.
The Illinois Second District Appellate Court found implied waiver of
the attorney-client privilege in Lama v. Preskill.2 6 The circuit court below
had imposed a contempt order against the defendant and her attorney when
they refused to produce documents they claimed were protected by the attorney-client privilege.27 The plaintiff sued for medical malpractice; the
defendant doctor asserted that the statute of limitations had run because the
plaintiff had discovered her injury more than two years prior.
The basis for the defendant's assertion was a visit by the plaintiffs
husband to an attorney directly after the surgery at issue, which, according
to the defendant, demonstrated that the plaintiff knew of her injury immediately following the surgery. 28 The plaintiff had anticipated that the statute
of limitations would be raised as a defense (because the surgery at issue had
occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint) and therefore included in the complaint that the statute of limitations had been tolled
by the discovery rule because she did not discover the injury until some
time after the surgery occurred.29
The defendant asserted that the plaintiff placed the privileged communications at issue by pleading the tolling of the statute of limitations in her
complaint. 30 The plaintiff argued that she had not placed the privileged
communications at issue because she was not relying on the communications in any offensive way, but rather it was the defendant that put the privileged communications in the forefront of the litigation by asserting the affirmative defense of untimeliness. 3'

23.
Id. at 243.
24.
Id. at 245.
25.
Id. at 246 ("Mere convenience, however, should not justify waiver of the attorney-client privilege.").
26.
818 N.E.2d 443 (I11.App. Ct. 2004).
27.
See id. at 445.
28.
See id. at 446.
29.
See id. at 449.
30.
See id. at 448.
31.
See Lama, 818 N.E.2d at 448.
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Quoting the Pyramid Controlsfederal court opinion,32 the Second District Appellate Court stated that at issue waiver occurs "where a party voluntarily injects either a factual or legal issue into the case, the truthful resolution of which requires an examination of the confidential communications. 3 3 The Lama court found that the plaintiff had voluntarily injected
into the case the factual and legal issues of when she learned of her injury
by raising the issue of whether she knew or should have known of her injury prior to the end of the limitations period in her complaint. 34 Therefore,
the court held that the plaintiff had waived her attorney-client privilege
regarding communications between
35 her husband (who was acting as her
agent) and the consulted attorney.
In dissent, Judge Bowman disagreed with the majority's analogizing to
PyramidControls specifically because Pyramid Controls applied the Hearn
test. 36 Judge Bowman noted the strong criticism levied against the Hearn
test by commentators and courts, especially "for focusing on the opposing
party's need for the privileged information despite the Supreme Court's
emphasis on the role of certainty in encouraging the full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients." 37 Judge Bowman stated that
application of the Hearn test would lead courts to find waiver too freely, "in
virtually every case where the statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense
and the client relies on the discovery rule to overcome the limitations period, the opposing party may discover confidential communications be38
tween the client and the attorney merely to test the client's credibility."
Judge Bowman recommended that Illinois should follow several states in
finding at issue waiver only "when the party asserting the privilege has injected the privileged material into the case, such that the information is actually required for resolution of the issue," thereby calling for "offensive or
direct use of privileged materials before the party will be deemed to have
waived its attorney-client privilege., 39 Although Judge Bowman's dissent
provides a cogent and coherent discussion of the tests and a clear recommendation, the majority decision fails to address the same (and does not
even mention Hearn) and is therefore of limited utility in divining the governing standard.
32.
See Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Automations, Inc., 176 F.R.D.
269, 272 (N.D. I11.1997).
33.
Lama, 818 N.E.2d at 448 (quoting Pyramid Controls, 176 F.R.D. at 272).
34.
See id. at 449.
35.
See id.
36.
See id. at 452 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
37.
Id.
38.
Lama, 818 N.E.2d at 452 (Bowman, J., dissenting) (citing Darius v. City of
Boston, 741 N.E.2d 52, 58 (Mass. 2001)).
39.
Id.at 452-53 (citing Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1030 (N.H. 1995);
Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166, 173 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000)).
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The Second District Court of Appeals backed off of its Lama decision
three years later in In re Estate of Wright.40 In In re Estate of Wright, the
court stated that Judge Bowman's Lama dissent was "well-reasoned" and
that "[g]iven the controversy surrounding the rule adopted in Lama" the
holding of Lama is to be confined to the facts of that case. 41 Although the In
re Estate of Wright court noted the "substantial criticism" brought against
the Hearn test, it did not explicitly reject that approach or elucidate a test to
be applied.4 a
Two years before Lama, the First District Appellate Court took up a
related issue in Shapo v. Tires 'n Tracks, Inc., where the defendant argued
that the settlement agreement entered into on its behalf was void because its
counsel lacked authority to bind it. 43 The defendant then attempted to block
the plaintiffs efforts to subpoena its former counsel to inquire into their
authority to settle on behalf of the defendant. 44 The court found that the
defendant waived its attorney-client privilege regarding the circumstances
surrounding the settlement agreement when it asserted that the agreement
was void based on its attorneys' lack of authority.45 Regardless of which
test is employed, the attorneys' conduct was placed "at issue," and thus this
finding of waiver-while proper-sheds little light on the standard to apply.
The only clues found in Shapo is the court's statement that the attorney-client privilege "may be waived as to a communication -put 'at issue' by
a party who is a holder of the privilege" without explaining what it means
to place a communication "at issue." 46 The court stated that, for example,
the privilege is waived when a client sues her former attorney for malpractice or when an attorney sues her client for fees (but this example is erroneous under the court's own standard because the attorney is not the holder of
the privilege)., 7
4 8 the Fourth District Court
In Western States Insurance Co. v. 0 'Hara,
of Appeals found that the plaintiff-insurance company had waived its attorney-client privilege regarding a settlement by seeking a declaratory judgment that the settlement had been made in good faith. However, in so finding, the court distinguished between communications "relevant" to the dis-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

881 N.E.2d 362 (11. App. Ct. 2007).
Id. at 367.
Id.
782 N.E.2d 813, 816 (I11.
App. Ct. 2002).
Id.at 816-17.
See id.
at 819-20.
Id.at 819.
See id.
828 N.E.2d 842 (III. App. Ct. 2005).
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pute from those placed "at issue"--perhaps
(although not explicitly) indi49
cating discontent with the Hearn test.
Illinois courts have consistently found implied waiver of the attorneyclient privilege when a client sues an attorney for malpractice. 50 That waiver is not limited to the malpractice action; once waiver has occurred, the
previously-privileged communications are discoverable by third-parties in
other actions.5" Similar to malpractice actions, the attorney-client privilege
is waived by a client in a criminal action when the client asserts ineffective
assistance of counsel in an attempt to obtain post-conviction relief. 52 This
waiver is sensible because the client, by calling the attorney's performance
into question, has placed privileged communications at issue but does little
to define which test to employ.
B.

A TEST FOR ALL SEASONS

Consistent application of at issue waiver in Illinois has suffered for
want of a definitive test. Lacking measured guidance, courts have too often
weighed the equities in the individual case in determining waiver of an absolute privilege. Consistent application of law is always important, but it is
particularly paramount in the field of privilege. Uncertainty in waiver chills
clients' communications with their legal advisors, thereby depreciating the
effectiveness and efficiency of counsel.
Illinois' lack of a definitive test does bless it with the benefit of the
hindsight of other jurisdictions' experiments-and follies-with at issue
waiver. Although many courts jumped at the three-pronged Hearn test at its
conception, borrowed wisdom counsels against its adoption in Illinois. The
Hearn test, with its central inquiry dependent on relevance, is misfocused:
49.
Id. at 851.
50.
See In re Marriage of Bielawski, 764 N.E.2d 1254, 1263 (11. App. Ct. 2002)
("When a client sues her attorney for malpractice, waiver is applicable to earlier communications between the now-adversarial parties."); SPSS, Inc. v. Carnahan-Walsh, 641 N.E.2d
984, 988 (I1. App. Ct. 1994) ("[A]ny expectation of confidentiality regarding the alleged
communication [the plaintiffs former attorney] had with the dissenters regarding the value
of the stock was waived when [the plaintiff] sued [its former attorney] not just in this appraisal action, but when it filed a legal malpractice claim against [the attorney].").
51.
See Marriageof Bielawski, 764 N.E.2d at 1263-64.
52.
See People v. O'Banner, 575 N.E.2d 1261, 1270 (Il. App. Ct. 1991) ("Where a
defendant has asserted ineffective assistance of counsel and thereby put in issue the substance of communications between herself and her attorney, the defendant has waived the
attorney-client privilege, and it is not error for the trial court to allow counsel to testify as to
conversations with the defendant."); see also People v. Romero, 470 N.E.2d 1080, 1082 (111.
App. Ct. 1984) ("By questioning his attorney's handling of the case and putting into issue
the substance of the conversations between himself and his attorney, defendant waived the
attorney-client privilege, and the trial court did not err in allowing counsel to testify as to his
conversations with defendant.").
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These decisions [following Hearn] are of dubious validity.
While the opinions dress up their analysis with a checklist
of factors, they appear to rest on a conclusion that the information sought is relevant and should in fairness be disclosed. Relevance is not the standard for determining
whether or
not evidence should be protected from disclo53
sure ....

As one court recently recognized: "Nowhere in the Hearn test is found the
essential element of reliance on privileged54advice in the assertion of the
claim or defense in order to effect a waiver.
Rather than focus on relevancy and fairness like the Hearn test, the anticipatory waiver test requires a litigant to choose to actually place a privileged communication at issue for at issue waiver to occur.55 By focusing on
relevancy and fairness, the Hearn test seeks to remedy the "problem"
caused by the truth-suppressing effect of the attorney-client privilege. The
anticipatory waiver test, on the other hand, seeks to address the problem
created by one party selectively relying on a privileged communication
while attempting to shield other privileged communications-thereby "garbling" the truth. 56 It is only in this "truth-garbling" scenario, rather than the

truth-suppressing scenario (a scenario inherent with all privileges), that
waiver of the privilege should be found.
III.

CONCLUSION

Illinois courts should, consistent with Judge Bowman's dissent in Lama, adopt the anticipatory waiver approach to deciding issues of at issue
waiver of the attorney-client privilege.5 7 This test finds waiver only where a
privilege-holder attempts to offensively use privileged information to defeat
a claim or defense. The privilege-holder therefore rightly acts as master of
the privilege and controls its invocation or waiver. A lesser threshold of
protection would compromise the privilege too gravely. Although privileges are not to be created cavalierly, when they are found they should not be
waived lightly.

53.
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 864 (3d Cir. 1994).
54.
In re Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008).
55.
See supra Part I.A-B.
56.
See, e.g., Wardleigh v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 891 P.2d 1180, 1186 (Nev.
1995).
Although Judge Bowman did not recommend the anticipatory waiver approach
57.
by name, it is consistent with his advice. See Lama v. Preskill, 818 N.E.2d 443, 452-53 (I11
App. Ct. 2004) (Bowman, J., dissenting).

